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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the impact of the disclosure of the participation of Brazilian firms listed on the Bolsa Brasil Balcão 
(B3) in corruption scandals through media scrutiny and by disclosure of independent auditors on the quality of accounting 
information, measured from the perspective of accounting conservatism. We examine the possible theoretical link between 
the disclosure of corruption scandals and the quality of accounting information in the Brazilian context. Brazil has gone 
through successive corruption scandals involving firms and government entities in different levels. Accounting can be an 
important tool to mitigate said risks based on the artifacts it has to inform key stakeholders. However, it is necessary to 
identify the extent to which these artifacts can be influenced by the actors involved in these scandals. The research places 
accounting as an instrument subject to pressures from different interests and that may be shaped to them. Although 
accounting is an instrument that must aim to reduce information asymmetry, preventing the harmful effects of corruption, 
in specific contexts, it can be used in the opposite direction, such as in cases of corruption and economic crises. We used the 
model based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005) with specific modeling characteristics for corruption and crisis. The models 
were estimated using the Stata 13 software using the pooled approach using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
method, clustered by year and economic sector, and the Generalized Least Squares (GSL) estimator. The results point to the 
presence of conservatism when disclosing involvement in investigations of corruption crimes in Brazil. This behavior was 
less intense in firms effectively mentioned in these events. These results highlight the relevance of studies aimed at clarifying 
the connections between corruption and accounting reports, enabling the development of measures to curb corruption in 
the business environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we evaluated whether the greater scrutiny 
of the national media and the records in independent 
auditor’s reports about the involvement of Brazilian firms 
listed on the B3 - Brazil Stock Exchange and Over-the-
Counter Market in corruption scandals is able to change 
the behavior of the level of accounting conservatism, 
measured for the timely loss recognition, from 2010 to 
2016.
In principle, one could imagine that the existence of 
a significant association between political entities and 
public companies would imply greater transparency in 
reporting the results of these firms, whether for legal 
reasons due to the inspection of government entities, or 
even due to media scrutiny. In other words, a high level 
of compliance with current accounting standards and 
better Quality of Accounting Information (QAI) would 
be expected. However, the studies by Chaney et al. (2010) 
concluded the opposite.
Chaney et al. (2010) state that there are at least 
three explanations for understanding this relationship 
differently. The first explanation is the financial benefit 
from relations with political entities, which act as an 
incentive for managers to hide, hinder, or be less 
transparent in these transactions to the detriment of 
investors’ interests. In Brazil, this takes on even more 
complicated aspects of observation and control, due to 
difficulties in the investigation and verification of illicit 
processes. Dowbor (2012) developed a very critical 
description of the paths of corruption in Brazil and showed 
how the sophistication of political connections combined 
with even more sophisticated financial processes allows 
the manipulation of information and the impunity of 
those involved in illegal acts.
The second explanation offered by Chaney et al. (2010) 
refers to the strength of the political connection that may 
provide a certain level of protection for connected firms, 
which would be exempt from punishment by inspection 
bodies and, thus, unconcerned about achieving better 
levels of QAI. In Brazil, this phenomenon was observed 
by Pinheiro et al. (2016), who stated that political and 
democratic stability could discourage the harm caused 
by political connections by generating more costs than 
benefits. However, the authors observed that in developing 
economies, due to the difficulty in raising funds and 
reducing risks and uncertainties, firms may seek political 
connections as a solution. Pletsch et al. (2018) proved that 
in Brazil the political connection is capable of reducing 
the cost of debt financing for public companies.
The third explanation presented by Chaney et al. (2010) 
is that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely 
to establish political connections. This would result in a 
strong correlation between a political connection and a 
lower QAI. This research follows the findings of Chaney 
et al. (2010), as it evaluates whether a specific incentive 
(scrutiny by the media and records in independent 
auditor’s reports disclosing the involvement of firms in 
corruption investigations) can increase the conservatism 
of the accounting information of firms with shares traded 
on B3. As a proxy for this incentive to change behavior, we 
used data that related publicly traded Brazilian companies 
to investigations of involvement in corruption crimes 
that had repercussions in the national media, as well as 
those recorded in the reports of independent auditors.
The study by Malagueño et al. (2010) analyzed the 
relationship between QAI and corruption and, among 
other conclusions, established that those countries that 
have effective regulation and judiciary, as well as a higher 
number of firms that hire independent auditors classified 
in the group of the four largest international accounting 
firms, the Big Four, besides of being better positioned 
in the Global Competitiveness ranking prepared by 
the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness 
Report), present better QAI and, thus, tend to be less 
corrupt.
It is clear that, in addition to the external dimension 
(politics, the effectiveness of the control made by 
democratic institutions) in which firms find themselves, 
some internal decisions or incentives hampers the analysis 
on this issue and the impact that it may have on the QAI. 
In this regard, we delimited the methodological procedure 
in an attempt to cover part of this problem.
From the perspective of the Agency Theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), the higher the level of QAI, the 
greater the limitation of the agent’s harmful behavior 
in its decisions (Antunes & Mendonça, 2008). In this 
research, we use timely loss recognition as a proxy for 
QAI, since it is commonly classified in the literature 
as a characteristic of conservatism. As interpreted by 
Basu (1997), conservatism represents the accounting’s 
demand for greater verification requirements for recording 
good news than bad news. In the same direction, Watts 
(2003) conceptualizes conservatism as the asymmetric 
verification requirements for gain and losses records - 
defined here as any information that increases the profits 
reported by the firms (gains) or, on the other hand, that 
reduces that reported amount (losses).
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Malagueño et al. (2010) found that the more QAI the 
greater the perception that the firm operates transparently, 
mitigating risks of involvement in corrupt practices, 
among other situations that can be detrimental to its 
results.
The interaction between timely loss recognition and 
the disclosure of the involvement of firms in investigations 
of corruption crimes has not been empirically examined 
in previous literature. Thus, here we investigate whether 
the media disclosure and the records from independent 
audit reports regarding the involvement of Brazilian firms 
in corruption crimes investigations increase the timely 
loss recognition.
The goal of this study is to assess whether a specific 
incentive (media scrutiny and records in independent 
audit reports) is able to change the behavior described by 
Chaney et al. (2010) in which managers are led to hide or 
be less transparent in situations of loss recognition. For 
this reason, we chose a proxy related to the accounting 
disclosure of a transaction (timely loss recognition).
The study further assesses the importance of QAI, 
given its use as a way to mitigate risks of involvement of 
firms in corruption crimes and for collaborating with the 
disclosure of the impact that the media and independent 
audit reports have on QAI in Brazil, focusing particularly 
on corruption scandals.
The results of this research indicate that media events 
and the independent auditor’s records can be associated 
with the increase in the timely loss recognition and that, 
for the firms effectively mentioned, such behavior was 
recorded with less intensity. Besides, for these firms, 
such timely loss recognitions appears to be much more 
strongly affected by periods of crisis than by the exposure 
by the media.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Timely Loss Recognition
From the perspective of agency problems, QAI refers to 
how useful accounting can act as a mechanism to prevent 
the expropriation of resources from capital suppliers 
(Defond & Zhang, 2014).
Yoon (2007) and Chen et al. (2010) defined the QAI 
based on its adequacy to basic accounting concepts and 
the way it represents the firm’s results and must reflect 
faithfully its economic situation. The authors, in their 
respective studies, clarified that the attributes of QAI 
assessment are: (i) accrual quality; (ii) persistence; 
(iii) predictability; (iv) smoothness; (v) reliability; (vi) 
relevance; (vii) timeliness; and (viii) conservatism.
Specifically, regarding conservatism, Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) conceptualized it as the difference between 
the firm’s book value (which tends to recognize new 
information with prudence) and the firm’s market value 
(including the expected value and the opportunity for 
growth). When the book value is less than the market 
value (that is, the market-to-book indicator is greater 
than 1), it means that the financial statements showed a 
certain level of conservatism.
The concept of conservatism developed by Watts 
(2003) concerns the difference required in the intensity 
of verifications to recognize expenses and revenues in 
accounting reports, due to the need for more robust 
(verifiable) contractual accounting metrics. This concept 
agrees with the studies by Basu (1997) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). Basu’s (1997) interpretation of 
accounting conservatism was that it had an asymmetric 
recognition, by accounting, of good news in relation to 
bad news. Thus, losses are recognized more opportunely, 
albeit with low verification, and are more likely to be 
recognized in the current period. Therefore, firms with 
negative returns (losses) in the current period tend to 
reverse this result in the following period (if the negative 
events are not confirmed or present themselves with less 
intensity), while, for the recognition of gains or other 
revenues, a higher level of verification is required. Firms 
with positive returns (profit) in the current period would 
tend to obtain positive results in the following period in 
a situation of high conservatism.
While maintaining the definition given by Basu (1997) 
for conservatism, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) stated that 
conservatism can be classified as conditional - when the 
anticipation of the record is related to the risk of economic 
loss, generating an asymmetry between the recognition of 
good and bad news, favoring the latter - or unconditional 
- when two equally valid options are evaluated and the 
one with the lowest profit and the lowest net equity is 
chosen. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) analyzed the timely 
loss recognition in English public and private companies, 
by accounting for accruals, and concluded that revisions 
to future cash flow expectations are recognized in current 
results through accruals, that is, accruals are positively 
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related to revisions in future cash flow expectations, and 
will be greater in the event of losses.
We adopted for this research the model of early loss 
recognition, developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
since it takes into account that bad news (for example: 
disclosure of firm involvement in corruption) is recorded 
as expenses as soon as they occur (not in future periods) 
and that such losses are transitory components of the 
result, that is, they are not persistent. The model is 
presented in Equation 1 below: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁� � �� � ��𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁���� � ��𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁���� � ���𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����  ∗  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁����� �  ℇ�� (1) 
 
 
in which ΔNIt represents the profit variation between 
the period t-1 and t; ΔDNIit–1 is a binary variable that 
receives the value 1 (one) for negative variations in the 
previous year’s profit and 0 (zero) for positive variations; 
ΔNIit–1 represents the profit variation from the period t-2 
to t-1; and (ΔDNIit–1 * ΔNIit–1) is the interaction variable 
for negative variations in profit.
According to Moreira (2009), in this model negative 
coefficients indicate that there was a reversal of profits. 
If the coefficients are positive, they indicate that the 
persistent profit components have not been reversed and 
will be negative, otherwise. The coefficient α2 indicates 
the profit response when the return is positive. Thus, 
it is expected to be positive and zero, indicating that 
there was a deferral of the recognition of gains until the 
moment when the cash flow is performed, and, in this 
case, the gain situation becomes a persistent component 
in the profit. On the other hand, if α2 is negative, there 
is a timely gain recognition.  The α3 coefficient is related 
to the recognition of losses, therefore, a value less than 
zero indicates the timing of the recognition of bad news. 
The sum of the coefficients α2 + α3 captures the full effect 
of the timely recognition of good and bad news. It is 
estimated that this sum must be less than zero, indicating 
that there was a timely loss recognition, that is, there were 
transitory decreases in the results that may be reversed 
in the subsequent period.
The influence of the scrutiny of the media under the 
conservatism of independent auditors pre- and post-
SOX was pointed out by Feldmann and Read (2010), 
who analyzed a sample composed of American firms 
that declared bankruptcy in the period from 2000 to 
2007. As a result of the study, they concluded that in the 
period 2002-2003 (post-SOX), there was a greater number 
of independent audit reports informing risks of going 
concern when compared to the period 2000-2001 (pre-
SOX), mainly due to media scrutiny. Additionally, they 
found that, in subsequent periods (2004 onwards), the 
number of reports informing risks involving going 
concern was reduced to the same pre-SOX level.
From another perspective, the economic environment 
is considered important to control the level of conservatism 
decision, as can be seen in the work developed by Beams 
and Yan (2015) who concluded that, due to the 2008 
financial crisis, there was an increase in the conservatism 
of the independent auditors, through the issuance of audit 
reports warning about the going concern, mainly, for that 
group of firms with financial difficulties.
2.2 Corruption Analysis Perspective
Kaufmann (2015) argues that corruption involves a 
network of politicians, organizations, firms, and private 
individuals who conspire to benefit from access to power, 
public resources, and politics to the detriment of the 
public good.
With no pretense of exhausting the list of harmful 
effects of corruption, it is possible to mention a few: 
increased market risks and uncertainties, reduced and 
inefficient investments, reduced economic and social 
development, damage to competition, and inefficiency 
of the public and private sector ( Delavallade, 2006; 
Mauro, 1996; Nguedie, 2018; Rady, 2016; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993).
In this sense, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) highlighted 
two reasons why corruption can be costly for the economic 
development of countries: (i) the weakness of the central 
government, which allows for increased bureaucracy and 
imposes bribes, which may prevent the continuation of a 
project and jeopardize investments; (ii) the need to keep 
the act of corruption a secret may preclude investments in 
important projects in the areas of health and education, 
to the detriment of potentially useless projects, such as 
in the areas of defense and infrastructure (if they present 
better opportunities for earnings).
La Porta et al. (2000) argued about the need to 
regulate the financial market and protect investors 
and exemplified with the models of regulation of the 
securities markets in the United States and Germany, 
which were successful and share a common element: the 
listed firms are required to fully disclose their financial 
information, as this is required by local regulatory bodies. 
Finally, La Porta et al. (2000) conclude that, although 
such disclosure is not enough by itself to guarantee the 
1
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rights of shareholders and creditors, it can help them 
to protect themselves.
It is also worth mentioning the studies by Amaral and 
Santos (2017), which, when analyzing the effect on the 
share price of firms punished for corruption under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), of 1977, resulting 
from the penalties imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC, civil sphere) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ, criminal sphere), identified that the 
abnormal returns were strongly adjusted negatively both 
on the day the punishment was announced and on the 
day after the event.
In general, corruption is understood, by developed 
countries, as an evil to be fought, since it can prevent 
free enterprise and hinder the strengthening of free 
competition. Therefore, actions around the world have 
been implemented to fight it, such as: the work of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), in which the signatory countries have undertaken 
to create specific anti-corruption laws; the edition of the 
English anti-corruption law (UK Bribery), on April 8, 
2010; and the edition of the Brazilian anticorruption Law 
(Law n. 12,846), on August 1, 2013 (Amaral & Santos, 
2017).
Some studies have been carried out in Brazil to describe 
the impact of corruption from different perspectives. 
In this sense, Sodré and Alves (2010) concluded that 
corruption is not directly related to the total amount 
received through amendments in favor of municipalities, 
but with the fact that it receives them regardless of 
the amount. Ferraz and Finan (2008) investigated the 
importance of transparency in Brazil and concluded 
that a Brazilian person, when well informed, can review 
his position about a candidate, especially if he has been 
related to some corruption act.
Ferraz et al. (2012) make a relationship between 
corruption and the quality of education and conclude 
that the education sector loses incentives and resources, 
especially teachers, who start to receive lower salaries and 
less training and also lower scores in national education 
assessments.
Caldas et al. (2016) investigated the relationship 
between the level of corruption and the composition of 
public spending and observed that, unlike other countries 
in Brazil, higher spending on education and health is 
positively related to the higher level of corruption, since 
Brazilian legislation establishes minimum investment 
amounts in the education sector compared to the total 
revenue collected, that is, there is an increase in expenses 
related to this area that are not necessarily reverted to 
improve the well-being of society.
2.3 Quality of Accounting Information, 
Corruption, and the Timely Loss 
Recognition
Accounting can play a significant role in the allocation 
of resources, in the risk calculation, in the management 
models, and in defining the terms of the debt contracts, 
since, these elements directly or indirectly end up 
interfering in the economic development of a country. 
Thus, an analysis of what can affect the generated QAI 
becomes relevant in any context (Chen et al., 2020).
For Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), the main threat to QAI 
would be the earnings opacity, which represents the 
variation between the numbers released by firms and 
those that would be the real ones, but which would be 
hidden, due to management decisions and accounting 
adjustments. For the author, the degree of earnings opacity 
arises from local pressures that also act as the main levers 
to change their behavior, making it clear that the level of 
corruption in a country is an important determinant of 
the level of earnings opacity.
Sargiacomo et al. (2015) assume that accounting 
and auditing have artifacts capable of identifying and 
suppressing acts of corruption. However, they believe that, 
in the same way, corrupt actors can compromise these 
artifacts in the generation of accounting information. 
The authors present how these acts can interfere in QAI, 
through a case study (“Operation Clean Hands”, against 
corruption in Italy, 1992-2002), to question accounting-
based anti-corruption policies. The authors conclude that 
although they believe in the potential that accounting 
has to prevent these situations, it is, on the other hand, 
influenced by corporate rules approved by those being 
or that might be investigated, which may allow them to 
block, or to determine the earnings opacity mentioned 
by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004).
Garcia and Teodósio (2020) analyzed the lessons 
of Italy (1990s) and Sweden (19th century) in facing 
corruption and drew a parallel with the Brazilian 
case, in which cases of corruption persist despite their 
public accounting and financial control systems. The 
authors state that Sweden’s success is mainly due to 
losses resulting from the war with Russia (1808-1809), 
political and bureaucratic reforms in its institutions, 
the implementation of interaction controls with 
private interests, the establishment of new rules for 
the functioning of the State and the strong movement 
of civil society. They also considered that the situation 
in Italy is similar to that in Brazil since in both cases 
the beginning of the fight against corruption occurred 
with a part of the judiciary causing the confrontation. 
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Both countries have limited control systems, already 
assimilated by systemic corruption and both societies are 
not very active in pressing for improvements in public 
governance. As a result, they suggest that the active role 
of civil society, in addition to robust accounting and 
control systems, is fundamental to fighting corruption.
Suzart (2012) investigated the importance of socio-
cultural aspects of a society on the level of disclosure of 
accounting information in 107 countries, taking into 
account the international convergence of accounting 
standards. One of the findings of the study shows 
that countries with high levels of bureaucracy and 
corruption have lower levels of disclosure of accounting 
information.
Santos and Takamatsu (2018) studied the effect of 
corruption in 20 emerging countries and the earnings 
opacity, as measured by earnings aggressiveness, loss 
aversion, and income smoothing. The results indicated 
that, in more corrupt countries, earnings have less 
informative power, with greater smoothing and greater 
aversion to losses.
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) state that QAI is the result 
of three main elements: (i) managerial motivation; (ii) 
accounting standards; and (iii) effective application 
of accounting standards (audit quality). Accounting 
information can be jeopardized due to some motivation 
that leads actors to manage results; as international 
accounting standards are based on general standards, 
there is the possibility of manipulating this information, 
or that such standards are insufficient to adequately 
monitor and portray an economic event. According to 
the authors, the difficulties emerge due to the complexity 
of extracting the motivations that are behind each 
manager.
Malagueño et al. (2010) identified the relationship 
between corruption and two QAI measures, the hiring 
of an independent auditor (Big Four) and the ranking of 
countries in the Global Competitiveness Report, prepared 
by the World Economic Forum. The authors concluded 
that the countries whose firms hired more independent 
auditors from the Big Four group of firms and which were 
also better positioned in the ranking had lower levels of 
perceived corruption.
Lara et al. (2009) discussed the impact of conservatism 
for QAI, with an investigation focused on the ability to 
reduce information asymmetry between shareholders 
(insiders) and other investors (outsiders). The results 
did not prove the increase in information asymmetry 
between different investors, on the contrary, it concluded 
that conservatism ends up being beneficial to all types 
of investors and other interested parties, such as capital 
lenders.
Accounting conservatism is a clear indication that bad 
news is incorporated into the result calculation before good 
news (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). 
In other words, conservatism leads to slower response 
of reported earnings to the occurrence of good news 
compared to bad news. Thus, the level of conservatism 
can have a significant impact on the profit reported by 
firms, defining to some extent their performance and, 
therefore, QAI (Basu, 1997).
In summary, accounting information is an important 
tool for the development of society, as it can act to limit 
corruption. However, studies demonstrate the possibility 
that accounting will suffer distortions and generate 
information that, instead of decreasing, may increase 
the information asymmetry between related parties and 
other stakeholders. Thus, the monitoring of QAI becomes 
relevant, especially from the perspective of conservatism, 
since it can reduce this asymmetry.
Sacramento and Pinho (2018, p. 120) state that:
even in formal democratic regimes, when values of self-
expression are relatively widespread, the population tends 
to protest against unpopular actions by political elites and 
to have the means to make their protests effective enough to 
influence the mass media to ‘patrol the corruption of elites 
and show failure more closely’.
The studies by Dhaliwal et al. (2017) confirmed the 
significant negative association between the issuance of a 
modified independent auditor’s report in China and the 
negative coverage of its clients by the press, especially 
during the period when litigation risks are greatest.
Thus, considering the firm’s involvement in corruption 
crimes and the fact that their disclosure fits as a negative 
fact (or bad news), we evaluated the following hypothesis 
(H1): the disclosure of the involvement of companies in 
investigations of corruption crimes increases the timely 
loss recognition.
This expectation is supported by the results of Beams 
and Yan (2015), who found that, due to the financial 
crisis of 2008, there was an increase in the conservatism 
of independent auditors through the issuance of audit 
reports warning about the going concern, especially for 
the group of firms with financial difficulties.
In this study, we also evaluated the impact of the 
financial crises from 2014 to 2016 on the timely loss 
recognition by publicly traded Brazilian companies, 
through the development of a complementary model, 
called the Crisis Model.
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3. METHODOLOGY
In this research, we used annual data from 327 
Brazilian firms, publicly-held corporations that trade 
shares in B3, from 01/01/2010 to 12/31/2016, with an 
“active” registration status. We collected the accounting 
information in the Economática database and considered 
the consolidated balance sheets in December of each year. 
As the model uses variables from the previous period for 
scheduling, the data covers the period from 2009 to 2016. 
We adopted the following procedures for the composition 
of the final sample:
i. Firms with B3 registration status as “canceled” were 
excluded;
ii. Firms listed in the Brazilian Depositary Receipts 
(BDRs) segment were excluded, given that they 
represent securities issued in Brazil, but backed by 
shares of foreign firms. Thus, they are not subject 
to the same information disclosure rules as other 
Brazilian firms;
iii. Firms with operations in the financial sector, funds, 
or classified as “others” in Economática database were 
excluded, to avoid bias, specification problems in the 
model estimations (Paulo, Cavalcante & Paulo, 2013), 
and that the data is not captured by the proposed 
model (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005);
iv. Continuous variables were standardized by excluding 
observations above three standard deviations from 
the standardized mean of each variable. It is worth 
mentioning that the adoption of this procedure resulted 
in the exclusion of information from Petróleo Brasileiro 
SA – Petrobras (a company listed on B3, widely cited 
in the media for involvement in corruption scandals, 
mainly in Operation Lava Jato) from the sample, since, 
on average, its indicators (assets, leverage, and others) 
differed from the other observations in the sample.
The independent auditors’ reports were obtained 
on the B3 website. Then, we carried out an analysis to 
identify whether the auditor recorded in his report that 
the firm was under scrutiny by the press for involvement 
in corruption in the corresponding year. Thus, 41 reports 
with such information were identified, being: 11 from 
Deloitte, 8 from PwC, 6 from KPMG, 5 from Ernst & 
Young, and 11 from other non-Big Four independent 
auditors (3 from Grant Thornton, 7 from BDO, and 1 
from Baker). These records were made with a disclaimer, 
emphasis, or key audit matters (KAM), as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 
Summary analysis of independent auditors’ reports (example)






Disclaimer - Investigations in the indirect investee Norte Energia S. A. ref. possible 
non-compliance with laws and regulations.
Emphasis - Audit report of indirect investee Madeireira Energia S. A. - MESA ref. 






Disclaimer - Risks related to compliance with laws and regulations on indirect 
investment in Norte Energia S. A.
Emphasis - Uncertainty related to possible impacts on the FS of the investee Madeira 
Energia S. A. - MESA, resulting from the outcome of the investigations and other legal 
measures from the Federal Prosecution Service against certain indirect shareholders 
and certain executives of these indirect shareholders. 
Braskem S.A. KPMG Auditores 2015 Emphasis – Ongoing internal investigation and Class Action in the United States.
Braskem S.A. KPMG Auditores 2016
Emphasis - Lava Jato investigation, payments without proof of consideration (2006-
2014), and leniency agreement signed with the Federal Prosecution Service.
KAM - Contingencies and disputes (Lava Jato and Class Action in the United States).
FS = financial statement.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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We surveyed the Google website and analyzed 
news reports that cited the involvement of firms in the 
corruption sample. Thus, 80 news items were selected, 
as shown in Table 2, considering the following selection 
criteria: (i) Main sources: newspapers and magazines of 
broad circulation and news sites, such as O Globo, Valor, 
Exame, UOL, O Estado de S. Paulo, Veja, and Carta Capital; 
(ii) Date: 2010 to 2016; (iii) Firms: only those listed in B3 
and included in the sample; (iv) Filter: one report in a 
given year was considered enough to register occurrence 
in the database; and (v) News content: mentioning of 
the firm in the news and what type of investigation it 
was involved in.
Table 2 
Source mentioning the firms in the press (exemplification)














Source: Prepared by the authors.
We found that most of the cases mentioned in the 
independent auditor’s reports were also cited by the press 
and that not all of the cases disclosed in the press were 
reported in the independent audit reports.
3.1 Model and Operational Variables
The research was based on the model developed by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005), related to the timely loss 
recognition as a measure of QAI, which in turn was 
elaborated based on Basu’s model (1997).
The model measures the timeliness of the accounting 
information contained in the results, in a context of great 
scrutiny by the press in case of corruption. We considered 
the specifications of the original model and added an 
independent variable, Cit . This variable is a dummy 
variable related to the disclosure of the involvement of 
firms in investigations of corruption crimes, both by the 
independent auditor and by the press.
Thus, when the independent auditor reports in his 
opinion or the press disclose that a firm has been or is 
being investigated for involvement in corruption crimes, 
the variable Cit assumes a value of 1 (one). Otherwise, it 
assumes the value 0 (zero).
The Main Model is described in the following 
Equation 2:
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 Table 3 presents a description of the variables and the expected signs.
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Table 3
Description of model parameters
Variable Expected result Operationalization
Varniit
α1Dvarniit–1 ( * )
Binary variable that assumes a value of 1 (one) in case of negative variations in the 
previous year’s profit and 0 (zero) in case of positive variations.
α2Varniit–1 α2 = 0
Variable that represents the variation in net profit of firm i in year t-1, weighted by the total 
assets at the beginning of year t-1. Indicates the persistence of profit.
α3(Varniit–1 * Dvarniit–1) α3 < 0 Interaction variable of negative profit variations. Differentiates the type of profit variations.
α4Cit α4 < 0
Binary variable that indicates the existence of disclosure of the involvement of firms in 
investigations of corruption crimes. Assumes a value of 1 (one) when there the firm is 
mentioned, and 0 (zero) when it is not mentioned.
α5(Cit * Dvarniit–1) ( * )
Interaction variable between the negative variations in the profit of firms cited in 
investigations of corruption crimes.
α6(Cit * Varniit–1) α6 = 0
Variable of interaction between variations in the net profit of firms cited in investigations of 
corruption crimes. Differentiates the mentioned firms.
α7(Cit * Varniit–1 * Dvarniit–1) α7 < 0
Interaction variable for negative variations in the net profit of firms cited in investigations 
of corruption crimes. Differentiates the firms mentioned
α8VarControleit ( * )
Control variables, namely: (a) logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Ln Ativoit); (b) return 
on assets (ROAit); (c) Dummy variable that indicates whether the firm’s net profit was 
negative (Dperdait), assuming the value 1 (one) if net profit is less than 0 (zero) or 0 (zero) 
otherwise; (d) firm leverage (Alafinit); and (e) operating cash flow weighted by total assets 
at the beginning of the year (FCOit).
(*) Ball e Shivakumar (2005) do not offer interpretation for the sign of the coefficients α0 e α1.
Source: Prepared from Paulo et al. (2013); Ball and Shivakumar (2005); Coelho, Cia and Lima (2009); Lennox, Francis and Wang 
(2012); and Chaney, Jeter and Shivakumar (2004), Basu (1997).
The coefficients of interest are those that contain the 
interaction with the characteristic “corruption”, Cit , that 
is, α5, α6 and α7 , and all are expected to be significant 
and negative.
To obtain the complete effect of the negative variations 
in the profits of the sample firms, we analyzed the sum of 
the coefficients α2 + α3 , which is estimated to be less than 
zero, indicating the occurrence of reversal of the transient 
components in the profits. And, to obtain the complete 
effect of the negative variations in the profits of the firms 
mentioned in investigations of corruption crimes, we 
analyzed the sum of the coefficients α2 + α3 + α6 + α7 , which 
must be greater than α2 + α3 , indicating the occurrence 
of reversal of transitory components in profits.
Table 4 describes the control variables of the models. 
LnAtivo controls the size of the firm; ROA and Dperda 
control the effects of profitability; and FCO and Alafin 
control debt and cash flow.
Table 4
Summary of control variables used in the model
Variable Formula
LnAtivo = Logarithm of total firm assets (Size) Ln (Total Assets)
ROA = Return on firm assets (Profitability) Net profit/((Total Assets (t) + Total Assets (t + 1))/2)
Dperda = Dummy variable that assesses the profit behavior Assumes value (1) if net profit < 0 and value (0) if net profit > = 0
FCO = Firm’s operating cash flow weighted by total assets Cash flow / Total Assets at the beginning of the year
Alafin = Degree of financial leverage (Indebtedness) (Net Profit/PL / (Net Profit / Total Assets)
Source: Prepared from Paulo et al. (2013); Lennox et al. (2012); and Chaney et al. (2004).
The regressions were estimated using the Stata 13 
software, through the pooled approach using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimation method, clustered by year 
and economic sector, as proposed by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). Additionally, simulations were carried out in 
clustered OLS per year and economic sector with the 
Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference and Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimators.
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Analysis of the assumptions of linear regression was 
carried out by applying the following tests: (i) Shapiro-
Francia test to assess the hypothesis of a normal distribution 
of residues; (ii) White test to verify the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity (if the variance of the residuals is 
constant); and (iii) Durbin-Watson test to assess the 
hypothesis of non-autocorrelation of the residues, that 
is, if the residues are independent. In addition to the 
assumptions, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was 
estimated to identify the occurrence of multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variables, and the obtained VIFs 
were below 4.
The White and Durbin-Watson tests identified, 
respectively, the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
of the error terms. To address this issue, we carried out 
simulations with the following estimators described 
by Wooldridge (2012): (i) Heteroskedasticity-Robust 
Inference, to adjust standard errors and statistics, so that 
they are valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity with 
an unknown form; and (ii) the Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS), which allows the correlation of the residuals. The 
analysis with the GLS estimator is presented in the main 
results, and the results of three other analysis are present 
in Appendix A.
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
To analyze the effect of disclosing the involvement 
of firms in corruption cases in increasing the timely loss 
recognition, we estimated the parameters of Equation 2 
in the Main Model. Additionally, considering that the 
literature describes that economic crises can affect the level 
of accounting conservatism, to assess the impacts of the 
2014-2016 economic crisis we estimated the parameters 
in the same Equation 2 in the Crisis Model. This model 
considers an additional binary variable, which assumes 
value 1 (one) for years of crisis and value 0 (zero) for 
years in which there was no crisis.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the main 
variables of the model adopted in this study.
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 





Varniit 1824 -0.0075 -0.0008 0.3653 -11.7466 5.7091 -0.0266 0.0184
Dvarniit (α1) 1824 0. 4879 0.0000 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Varniit-1 (α2) 1824 -0.0013 0.0006 0.5783 -11.7466 16.9139 -0.0229 0.0207
Dvarniit–1 * Varniit–1 (α3) 1824 -0.04173 0.0000 0.3184 -11.7466 0.0000 -0.0229 0.0000
Cit (α4) 1824 0. 1798 0.0000 0.3841 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cit * Dvarniit–1 (α5) 1824 0.0997 0.0000 0.2997 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cit * Varniit–1 (α6) 1824 0.0026 0.0000 0.2840 -4.4524 11.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cit * Dvarniit–1 * Varniit–1 (α7) 1824 -0.0076 0.0000 0.1114 -4.4524 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LnAtivoit 1824 14.5075 14.7017 1.8277 8.9084 19.6606 13.3867 15.7328
Dperdait 1824 0.3267 0.0000 0.4691 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ROAit 1824 0.0096 0.0241 0.1362 -1.0149 1.0437 -0.0189 0.0685
Alafinit 1824 2.1581 1. 500 42.148 -754.80 741.1 0.5000 2.4000
FCOit 1824 0.0609 0.0587 0.1071 -1.8679 1.0662 0.0152 0.1101
Notes: (i) Varniit = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
Varniit–1 = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t-1; Dvarniit–1 
= dummy variable that indicates whether there is a negative variation in the net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Varniit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Ln Ativoit = logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; ROAit = return on 
assets of firm i in year t; Dperdait = dummy variable that indicates whether the net profit of firm i in year t was negative, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Lucroit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Alafinit = leverage of firm i in year t; FCOit = operating cash flow of firm i 
in year t weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; Cit = Modelo Principalit = dummy variable that indicates whether firm 
i was mentioned in a corruption crime investigation in year t, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 (zero) otherwise; (ii) 
Obs = observations; SD = standard deviation.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Note that due to the effect of the economic crisis that 
lasted for successive years (2014 to 2016), the variable 
Varniit-1 has a mean and median lower than the same 
statistics as the variable Varniit, which signals a reduction 
in corporate profits in the current period at the expense 
of profit in the previous period. This highlights the 
relevance of controlling for the economic crisis factor 
when analyzing this work’s conclusions.
The Financial Leverage indicator (Alafin) mean was 
2.1581, a value above the median. The same occurs with the 
Operating Cash Flow (FCO) indicator, which presented 
a mean of 0.0609, also above the median. This indicates 
that the results of this work are being influenced by firms 
with greater leverage and which have more representative 
cash flows since they make up the 75th percentile of the 
distribution.
4.2 Correlation Matrix
Table 6 presents the estimated correction between the 
variables of the model adopted in this study.
Table 6
Pearson Correlation Matrix
Variable Varniit Dvarniit-1 Varniit-1 Ln Ativoit Dperdait ROAit Alafinit FCOit
Varniit 1
Dvarniit-1 0.0853* 1
Varniit-1 -0.7178* 0.1422* 1
Ln Ativoit 0.0344 -0.0107 0.0000 1
Dperdait -0.1153* 0.1945* 0.0070 -0.1561* 1
ROAit 0.3138* -0.1757* -0.1162* 0.1716* -0.6172* 1
Alafinit 0.0115 -0.0433 -0.0194 0.0044 -0.0258 0.0304 1
FCOit -0.0422 -0.0863* 0.0122 0.0974* -0.3008* 0.03611* 0.0136 1
Notes: (i) Varniit = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
Varniit–1 = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t-1; Dvarniit–1 
= dummy variable that indicates whether there is a negative variation in the net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Varniit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Ln Ativoit = logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; ROAit = return on 
assets of firm i in year t; Dperdait = dummy variable that indicates whether the net profit of firm i in year t was negative, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Lucroit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Alafinit = leverage of firm i in year t; FCOit = operating cash flow of firm i in 
year t weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t.
* indicates a significance level of 5%, marked in bold.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
In Table 6, the dependent variable Varniit (variation 
in net income in the current period) showed a significant 
and negative correlation with the following variables: (i) 
Varniit-1 (variation in lagged net income); and (ii) FCO 
(operating cash flow of the firm), in line with Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), which signals a trend of timely loss 
recognition.
4.3 Regression Models
Table 7 presents the results of the regressions of the 
Main Model and the Crisis Model, estimated using the 
pooled approach through the OLS estimation method, 
clustered by year and economic sector, and the Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator.
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Main Model Crisis Model
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Constante (α0) 0.0401283 0.004 0.0534578 0.008
Dvarniit–1(α1) 0.0067331 0.002 0.0070135 0.001
Varnit–1(α2) -0.5946120 0.000 -0.5325127 0.000
Dvarniit–1*Varniit–1(α3) 0.4216917 0.000 0.1861643 0.000
Cit(α4) -0.0095063 0.019 -0.0098676 0.021
Cit*Dvarniit–1(α5) 0.0145291 0.000 0.0057386 0.220
Cit*Varniit–1(α6) 0.2183516 0.000 0.2341382 0.000
Cit*Dvarniit–1*Varniit–1(α7) -0.1396247 0.003 -0.4587068 0.000
Ln Ativoit -0.0042459 0.000 -0.0059938 0.000
Dperdait 0.0101151 0.000 0.0000755 0.980
ROAit 0.883639 0.000 0.8620915 0.000
Alafinit -0.0005893 0.012 -0.0000224 0.321
FCOit -0.2972948 0.000 -0.1554819 0.000
AnoCriseit - - 0.0241777 0.000
Notes: (i) Varniit = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; 
Varniit–1 = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t-1; Dvarniit–1 
= dummy variable that indicates whether there is a negative variation in the net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Varniit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Ln Ativoit = logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; ROAit = return on 
assets of firm i in year t; Dperdait = dummy variable that indicates whether the net profit of firm i in year t was negative, assuming 
a value of 1 (one) if Lucroit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Alafinit = leverage of firm i in year t; FCOit = operating cash flow of firm i in 
year t weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; Cit = Modelo Principalit = dummy variable that indicates whether firm i 
was mentioned in a corruption crime investigation in year t, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 (zero) otherwise;  
Cit = Crisis Modeloit = dummy variable indicating whether year t is a year of crisis, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 
(zero) otherwise.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The interpretation of the recognition of gains and 
losses, following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) follows: gains 
in firms that were not mentioned: α2; losses in firms that 
were not mentioned: α2 + α3; gains in the firms mentioned 
in cases of corruption: α2 + α6; losses in firms mentioned 
in cases of corruption: α2 + α3 + α6 + α7.
To assess the full effect of timely loss recognition, 
we add the coefficients α2 + α3, resulting in a value less 
than zero in both the Main Model (-0.1729203) and the 
Crisis Model (-0.3463484). This result corroborates the 
idea of conditional recognition behavior. However, it 
is important to observe the intensity of this value in a 
crisis period, which indicates an increase in conditional 
behavior in this period.
Note that α7 is less than zero, which shows that losses 
tend to be recognized in a timely manner when these 
firms are exposed by the media and auditors in situations 
that involve corruption. This occurs in both the Main 
and Crisis Models, indicating that the disclosure made 
by the media and auditors interferes with the timely loss 
recognition. However, when the analysis is expanded 
and the sum of the coefficients is α2 + α3 + α6 + α7 is 
considered, although the result continues to corroborate 
the existence of conditional recognition, its intensity is 
lower, in the opposite direction of the hypothesis suggested 
in this paper. In the Main Model, the sum of the four 
coefficients is (-0.0941934), being greater than the sum 
of the coefficients α2 + α3 (-0.1729203). Note that this 
differs in the model in which the effect of the Crisis is 
evaluated, in which α2 + α3 is equal to -0.3463484 and 
the sum α2 + α3 + α6 + α7 is -0.5709170. In other words, 
the effect of the crisis seems to have a greater impact on 
timely loss recognition than the disclosure of the firm’s 
involvement in corruption schemes.
An explanation for the lower impact of the media is 
provided by Pinho and Sacramento (2009), who analyzed 
the concept of vertical accountability. The authors explain 
that the “vertical” characteristic concerns the dimension of 
forces external to the connections involved in the possible 
act of corruption, citing as an example the social demands 
and the media performance. The authors argue that the 
relevance of media performance can decrease when it is 
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seen as partial, that occurs when it defines or names those 
alleged to be responsible for the crimes of corruption, and, 
at other times, contributes to the conviction of innocents 
by public opinion instead of the real culprits. As shown, 
the subject has complex dimensions.
Regarding the accounting aspect, we highlight some 
elements that can change the behavior of timely loss 
recognition. One of these factors refers to earnings 
management, as discussed by Moreira (2009). Firms 
manage their results through the choice of accounting 
criteria to meet different interests. If those interests come 
from political connections, for example, and if those 
connections are very strong, the timely loss recognition 
aspect can be attenuated. And, to a certain extent, this 
could justify the lack of response to the pressure of media 
scrutiny in recognizing the loss, as the strong political 
connection can reduce the fear of punishment of fraud by 
the firms that have these connections (Lazzarini, 2011).
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This study investigated the relationship between the 
disclosure of the involvement of firms in corruption 
investigations and the timely loss recognition, with the 
latter as a proxy for the quality of accounting information.
Thus, we based our study on previous researches 
that evaluated the interaction between media scrutiny 
and the disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls by 
independent auditor’s reports; Based on this literature, 
we included the perspective of vertical accountability 
(external/media) and the perspective of the insider 
(auditor) as reducers of information asymmetry.
Following the model developed by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), we included specific characteristics to test the 
hypothesis that the disclosure of the involvement of 
Brazilian firms in investigations of corruption crimes 
increases the timely loss recognition. The results show 
that timely loss recognition allows us to characterize 
accounting conservatism in the firms cited in corruption 
schemes. However, when compared to the group of firms 
that were not mentioned in the media, this conditional 
behavior is shown to be lower, rather than greater, as 
suggested by our research hypothesis, which may indicate 
that the citation in corruption schemes alone does not 
increase the timely loss recognition. The expected 
behavior with the analysis of corruption news was equal 
to the behavior observed when the conditional behavior 
calculation was controlled by periods of economic crisis, 
in which periods of crisis enhance timely loss recognition.
The smaller impact of media scrutiny may be related 
to other factors not addressed in this research, such as 
the immaturity of our popular action institutions, or even 
the cultural filter by which the information is subject, 
decreasing its impact in the Brazilian context (Sacramento 
& Pinho, 2016).
A better understanding of the impact caused by 
information from the specialized media in a society that 
can be influenced by social networks, public opinion 
drivers, and disinformation emitters is also necessary 
(Cardoso, 2019). In terms of the operational aspect of the 
research, another limitation is the wide dispersion and 
variety of news published on the internet on the topic of 
corruption and the involvement of Brazilian firms in the 
practice. This can hinder data collection and decrease 
the possible impact of the news and, depending on how 
society sees such a vehicle (positioning bias), the news may 
lose its informative value (Sacramento & Pinho, 2016).
It is also very important to point out that the complexity 
of the theme requires an important modeling effort, which 
may not be fully described without considering elements 
outside the accounting context that are specific to Brazil 
and may be important in interpreting a broader context 
of fraud (Lazzarini, 2011). It is necessary to model how 
the other levers that induce fraud and opportunistic 
accounting choices that were not addressed by this research, 
based, for instance, on political connections, off-balance 
transactions, corporate governance, aggressiveness in the 
interpretation and application of accounting standards, 
compliance, and audit mechanisms (Murcia, 2007).
We also highlight the role of corporate governance as a 
suggestion for future research on this topic, which should 
ensure the mapping of the potential risks of maneuvering 
existing internal controls and prevent other interests from 
interfering in the preparation of the financial statements. 
On the other hand, the Audit should also be able to 
guarantee accounting statements in line with current 
norms and without frauds.
The corruption issue remains relevant for society 
and, especially, for accounting professionals, who can 
play an important role in avoiding the occurrence of 
new cases of corruption and the harmful effects of such 
practice, clarifying the impact that corruption imposes 
on financial statements and fostering the interest of civil 
society in acting and pushing for improvements in public 
governance.
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APPENDIX A
Results from Pooled OLS Regression Model vs. Polled OLS with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference Estimator vs. Polled OLS with 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Estimator
Varniit
MAIN MODEL








































Note: References (1)/(2)/(3) in the column headings indicate the simulated econometric models, being: (1) Pooled OLS 
regression model; (2) Polled OLS with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference Estimator; and (3) Polled OLS with Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) Estimator; Varniit  = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, weighted by total assets at the beginning 
of year t; Varniit–1 = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t-1; 
Dvarniit–1 = dummy variable that indicates whether there is a negative variation in the net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
assuming a value of 1 (one) if Varniit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; LnAtivoit = logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; ROAit = 
return on assets of firm i in year t; Dperdait = dummy variable that indicates whether the net profit of firm i in year t was negative, 
assuming a value of 1 (one) if Lucroit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Alafinit = leverage of firm i in year t; FCOit = operating cash flow 
of firm i in year t weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; Cit = Main Modelit = dummy variable that indicates whether 
firm i was mentioned in a corruption crime investigation in year t, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 (zero) otherwise; 
Cit = Crisis Modelit = dummy variable indicating whether year t is a year of crisis, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 
(zero) otherwise.
*, ** and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Note: References (1)/(2)/(3) in the column headings indicate the simulated econometric models, being: (1) Pooled OLS 
regression model; (2) Polled OLS with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Inference Estimator; and (3) Polled OLS with Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) Estimator; Varniit = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, weighted by total assets at the beginning 
of year t; Varniit–1 = variation in net profit of firm i from year t-2 to year t-1, weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t-1; 
Dvarniit–1 = dummy variable that indicates whether there is a negative variation in the net profit of firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
assuming a value of 1 (one) if Varniit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Ln Ativoit = logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; ROAit = 
return on assets of firm i in year t; Dperdait = dummy variable that indicates whether the net profit of firm i in year t was negative, 
assuming a value of 1 (one) if Lucroit < 0, or 0 (zero) otherwise; Alafinit = leverage of firm i in year t; FCOit = operating cash flow 
of firm i in year t weighted by total assets at the beginning of year t; Cit = Main Modelit = dummy variable that indicates whether 
firm i was mentioned in a corruption crime investigation in year t, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 (zero) otherwise; 
Cit = Crisis Modelit = dummy variable indicating whether year t is a year of crisis, in which it assumes a value of 1 (one), or 0 
(zero) otherwise.
*, ** and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors
